官方的 MASTR 标志 MASTR 支持这项工作
目录
← 知识库首页

Wallets & security

A trusted frontend can still ask for the wrong transaction

Review the final wallet request, not only the page that produced it.

Research guide · 9 September 2026 · 1 min read

研究文章和参考条目以英语发布。导航提供七种语言。

人物与项目

本文目录
  1. Compare intent with the request Record the selected operation, network, destination, asset and amount. Compare those with the final call data and any nested actions. Include token allowances or additional transfers introduced as part of a batch. The same button can conceal different behaviour after a compromised update.
  2. Check more than the screenshot A screenshot establishes what was displayed, not everything that was signed. For a reproducible finding, preserve the relevant software version and request structure. Where a simulation is used, record the state and assumptions that made it produce that result.
  3. Keep testing controlled Use authorised environments and funds you control. A demonstration should establish the mismatch without exposing other users. The resulting report should state the exact difference between the intended action and the authorisation produced, followed by the impact that difference permits. General claims about an insecure frontend are less useful than a specific failed boundary.

A financial interface sits between user intent and contract execution. Its appearance, domain history and familiar branding do not prove that the final transaction matches the action the user selected. The review boundary is the complete request presented for authorisation.

Compare intent with the request Record the selected operation, network, destination, asset and amount. Compare those with the final call data and any nested actions. Include token allowances or additional transfers introduced as part of a batch. The same button can conceal different behaviour after a compromised update.

Compare the interface description with the actual transaction, its chain and intended effects. A second view is useful only if it does not repeat the same compromised data source. This is a review process, not a claim that simulation prevents every loss.
Compare the interface description with the actual transaction, its chain and intended effects. A second view is useful only if it does not repeat the same compromised data source. This is a review process, not a claim that simulation prevents every loss.
查看完整图表

Check more than the screenshot A screenshot establishes what was displayed, not everything that was signed. For a reproducible finding, preserve the relevant software version and request structure. Where a simulation is used, record the state and assumptions that made it produce that result.

Keep testing controlled Use authorised environments and funds you control. A demonstration should establish the mismatch without exposing other users. The resulting report should state the exact difference between the intended action and the authorisation produced, followed by the impact that difference permits. General claims about an insecure frontend are less useful than a specific failed boundary.

来源

Ethereum documentation · security

Technical reference checked 9 September 2026. The review questions are editorial analysis, not findings about a named project.

相关阅读

MASTR

支持独立研究

这里的调查、原始证据和指南均可免费阅读。自愿捐赠帮助支付研究成本,让 MASTR 能够继续提供工具。

打开钱包