Origini e storia · 1982–2008
Before Bitcoin: privacy, digital cash and the missing agreement
The history begins with several different problems: private payments, costly computation, ownership and agreement about what was already spent.
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MASTR · CRYPTO & WEB3
Atlante: storia e sistemi
Comprendi le origini delle criptovalute, i legami tra i sistemi e le dipendenze dalla fiducia.
I capitoli e i grafici tecnici sono in inglese. La navigazione è disponibile in sette lingue.
Percorsi di lettura
Scegli una domanda e segui un percorso breve e ordinato nella biblioteca.
01
Dal denaro digitale ai sistemi programmabili
6 · Capitoli di riferimento · 18 min →02Prima di firmare
4 · Capitoli di riferimento · 12 min →03Seguire il denaro e l’uscita
6 · Capitoli di riferimento · 18 min →04Le garanzie dell’infrastruttura
4 · Capitoli di riferimento · 12 min →05Da un’affermazione alle prove
5 · Capitoli di riferimento · 15 min →06Che cosa possiedi davvero?
4 · Capitoli di riferimento · 12 min →24 · Capitoli di riferimento
Origini e storia · 2009 onward
Bitcoin’s early lesson: money rules need independent verification
Keys authorise a spend, nodes decide whether it is valid, and proof of work orders the valid history. None of those jobs should be confused.
Origini e storia · 2015–2021
The scaling debate: block space, verification and the right to exit
SegWit and payment channels show why scaling is a choice about resources and trust, not just a larger transactions-per-second number.
Origini e storia · 2015–2018
Programmable money: why token standards changed the industry
Common interfaces made wallets and markets reusable. They did not make every asset economically equivalent or safe.
Origini e storia · 2018–2021
DeFi’s expansion: pooled liquidity, collateral and rented activity
Automated markets and token incentives changed how users could provide capital, and made headline growth harder to interpret.
Origini e storia · 1993 onward
Privacy after the public ledger: what zero knowledge does and does not hide
A valid proof, a hidden amount and an anonymous user are three different claims. Privacy has to be assessed across the whole interaction.
Mercati e incentivi · 2014 onward
Stablecoins: the token, the reserves and the redemption queue
A price target is not a complete description of the claim. Follow the route from token holder to the assets that are meant to support redemption.
Mercati e incentivi · 2014–2024
The credit layer: why visible reserves are not a complete balance sheet
Exchange collapses and lending failures are easier to understand when assets, liabilities, control and withdrawal rights are kept separate.
Mercati e incentivi · Core market mechanics
Market cap versus the exit: a worked liquidity model
A marginal quote values the whole supply on paper. Selling a position changes the pool that produced that quote.
Mercati e incentivi · DeFi risk mechanics
Oracles and liquidation: when a price becomes an instruction
A number becomes dangerous when a contract uses it to decide borrowing capacity, settlement or liquidation.
Mercati e incentivi · 2024–2026
The launch economy: bots, bundles and the meaning of a holder count
The research literature and MASTR’s archive help separate activity, execution advantage, revenue and evidence of coordinated ownership.
Mercati e incentivi · 2020 onward
Staking receipts and restaking: one asset, several dependencies
A tradable receipt improves flexibility, but it does not remove validator, withdrawal, smart-contract or collateral risk.
Infrastruttura e proprietà · Cross-chain systems
Bridges: a message, a verifier and a claim on another chain
Moving an asset across chains usually creates dependencies between two state machines. Follow the verifier and the redemption route.
Infrastruttura e proprietà · 2020 onward
Rollups: execution is only one part of the security model
Separate transaction ordering, state verification, data availability and the user’s ability to exit.
Infrastruttura e proprietà · Modular blockchain design
Data availability, historical storage and the limits of a hash
A commitment can authenticate data without supplying it. Publishing data now and preserving it for years are related but different jobs.
Infrastruttura e proprietà · Web3 storage
IPFS and content addressing: authenticity is not persistence
A content identifier helps identify bytes. Someone still has to preserve and serve those bytes.
Infrastruttura e proprietà · 2017 onward
NFTs after the boom: the token, the artwork and the permission
An ownership record, an image file and a licence are different objects. A durable reference follows all three.
Infrastruttura e proprietà · Web3 identity
Names and sign-in: readable identity without assuming trust
A name can resolve an address and a signature can prove key control. Neither alone establishes a trustworthy person or business.
Controllo e prove · Wallet security
The signing boundary: a valid signature can authorise the wrong thing
The chain can execute a maliciously requested action perfectly. Read the authority being granted, not just the button label.
Controllo e prove · ERC-4337 and EIP-7702
Smart accounts: recovery, delegation and the new control map
Programmable accounts can improve recovery and permissions, but the account’s validation rules become part of what the user must understand.
Controllo e prove · 2016 onward
DAO governance: follow the vote all the way to execution
A public vote can be transparent while power remains concentrated in delegation, proposal rights, upgrade keys or execution.
Controllo e prove · Research method
From a wallet graph to a finding someone else can reproduce
Preserve observations, test alternative explanations and distinguish a transaction path from a claim about identity or intent.
Controllo e prove · Research method
What the dashboard counts: addresses, transactions, volume and people
A chain can be busy without every transaction representing a new person, a successful trade or an economic gain.
Controllo e prove · Web2 and Web3 dependencies
A decentralised chain can still have a fragile front door
Domains, browsers, hosting, RPC providers and indexers sit between a user and the chain. Their failures are not all consensus failures.